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nature of the system itself, and by the
type of behavior it motivates on the part
of many of the individuals in it. As such,
the gap is unlikely to be bridged in the
near future.
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Bridging the Gap Between Economic
Theory and Fisheries Management:
Can the MFCMA Produce Economically
Rational Management? Discussion
JAMES E. KIRKLEY

Discussing the relationship between
economic theory and fisheries manage
ment is a difficult task to ask of anyone.
It is nearly impossible to do when the
discussion is restricted to practical as
pects. Given the complexity of such a
discussion, Lee G. Anderson has pro
vided an excellent discussion on the
problems of managing fisheries with the
MFCMA, particularly those relating to
economics.
More important, I believe, is that An
derson has clearly identified and stated
the problems which have limited the
management of fisheries in accordance
with economic goals and objectives. This
has obviously been a source of consider-
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able frustration among economists in
volved in fisheries management.
Anderson poses one fundamental
question about economics and manage
ment. The question is "Is it likely that
sound and economically rational man
agement will be produced?" in accord
ance with economic criteria. The criteria
are concerned with proper use of fish and
other resources over time with appropri
ate attention given to all related costs in
cluding harvest, programmatic, manage
ment, implementation, and enforcement
costs. The answer offered by Anderson,
and which I concur, is "Not very."
Two reasons why sound management
will not be produced are given by Ander
son. First, the institutional setting and in
dustry structure hinders management.
Second, the politically astute and power
ful minorities force attention on self
serving interests or away from economic
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goals and objectives. These are the same
problems identified in the literature on
regulating industry (e.g., Buchanan and
Tollison, 1984; Crain, 1979; Eckert,
1973; Sen, 1970; Hilton, 1972; Mc
Cormick and Tollison, 1981). Other rea
sons given in the literature for the failure
of rational management include issue
linkages or making trade-offs explicit
among issues, conflicts of interest, and
payment of managers and regulators. All
of these would appear to be valid causes
for the failure to achieve sound economic
management of fisheries.
Anderson provides a comprehensive
discussion of the institutional setting and
structure by which fisheries are managed
and regulated under the MFCMA. His
paper, in fact, might be more appropri
ately titled "Collective choice, conflict
ing criteria, and agency theory in manag
ing fisheries." He notes the existence of
multiple objectives, which are often quite
diverse; the fact that there are many
agents and individuals which affect or are
affected by fisheries management; and
that, in practice, management is often
something upon which all concerned can
agree.
One aspect of the institutional setting
which is properly accorded rigorous
treatment in the paper is the relationship
between the Fishery Management Coun
cils and the National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS). It is proposed that the
relationship is one of animosity in which
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the Council members and staff believe
that NMFS is attempting to make the
work of Councils more difficult and to
take control of fisheries management.
This argument has been heard many
times and there is possibly some element
of truth to it. On the other hand, NMFS' s
staff have often complained that the
Councils are attempting to exclude them
from the management process or are not
adhering to the guidelines which must be
followed. There also is likely to be some
truth to this. However, as correctly indi
cated by Anderson, these attitudes are not
conducive to good management.
There is, though, another problem be
tween the NMFS and the Councils which
needs to be resolved. That is the problem
of data sharing. Currently, NMFS col
lects and distributes most of the data nec
essary for formulating management plans
and policies. However, the distribution
of the data is often subject to restrictions.
These restrictions may result in inade
quate data for formulating and analyzing
management plans and regulations.
Thus, it is uncertain whether or not the
council staff are provided the best data
available and that management is based
on the best available scientific informa
tion. The only immediate solution to this
problem is for the councils to request par
ticular analyses from NMFS.
Subsequently proposed in the paper is
a political "bioregunomic" approach, the
purpose of which is to provide an ex
panded analysis of the entire manage
ment process. This includes understand
ing legislative behavior regarding policy
and budgets, enforcement activities, firm
behavior, and the stock dynamics. The
approach captures the entire institutional
structure and allows for the consideration
of other activities such as lobbying fish
ery agencies or the formation of "special
interest" groups.
The major importance of the proposed
approach is that it indicates that rational
economic management requires an
understanding of activities by individuals
and agencies other than NMFS, the
Councils, and the fishing industry, and
that fisheries utilization involves other
types of management costs. In effect, the
political bioregunomic approach focuses
attention on a regulated equilibrium and
an optimum utilization which considers
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all economic aspects of firm production,
lobbying, avoiding regulation, and insti
tuting and monitoring management pol
icy.
Most economists and managers would
concur with the need to consider all the
possible interactions suggested by An
derson. However, we must consider the
issues of whether or not it is possible to
consider all the interactions, and what are
the ramifications of not doing so. Previ
ous experience would suggest it is neither
possible nor feasible to adequately con
sider all the interactions of so complex a
system. We do not, as yet, appear to be
able to deal with even the basic economic
and biological issues. Nevertheless,
Anderson's argument for considering a
broader management framework is cor
rect.
A second question posited by Ander
son is "How can the institutional and in
dustry structures be altered such that the
regulated equilibrium coincides with the
expanded notion of optimal utilization?"
Alternatively, "What types of regulation
are optimal when the costs related to ac
tivities other than fishing are consid
ered?"
A concise answer to this very difficult
question is not provided in the paper.
There is not, in fact, likely to be an easy
answer. As I interpret Anderson, the
process of formulating, implementing,
monitoring, and enforcing management
and regulations is too complex to offer an
answer to the problem.
Anderson does, however, imply some
possible solutions:
I) Other interests should be repre
sented on the councils (e.g., consumer
advocates and planners).
2) Encourage broader response to pro
posed management plans and regula
tions.
3) Promote greater cooperation be
tween the states and Councils.
4) Induce the U.S. Coast Guard to act
in a coordinated way with NMFS.
5) Specify objectives that have opera
tional significance.
6) Identify a set of alternative plans
which specify optimum yield and how
the harvest will be limited to that level.
7) Impose a single-source account
ability for success of a plan and grant it

sufficient latitude and resources to do the
job.
There are, though, some possible
problems with the implied solutions.
First, prior attempts to broaden interests
and responses have not been successful;
there was often a lack of knowledge or
understanding about fisheries and man
agement. Second, some states have legal
barriers which prevent cooperation.
Third, the Coast Guard has experienced
budget reductions, and thus, curtailed its
fishery-related activities. They are not
likely to increase their level of coopera
tion without increases in their operating
budget. Fourth, if operational objectives
are well specified such that trade-offs are
permitted, other interests will likely
dominate the economic criteria and ob
jectives. Last, a single-source account
ability does not necessarily guarantee
good management. Currently, the Secre
tary of Commerce has final approval and
is responsible for the fishery manage
ment plan. Yet, there is not one FMP
with well specified economic goals and
objectives.
Overall, I find little to criticize or find
fault with in the paper by Anderson. Pol
itics and "back-room bargaining" are an
integral part of the management process;
they do result in exploitation patterns
which are not economically optimum.
The fact that there is a trade-off between
efficiency and equity in formulating
management policies is well recognized;
the equity aspects should be considered
as well as the efficiency aspects (Layard
and Walters, 1978). In general, I am in
complete agreement with Anderson that
given the economic criteria and institu
tional structure, it is not very likely that
sound economically rational manage
ment will be produced under MFCMA.
In diffidence to Anderson, however, I
do not believe that the fault lies entirely
with the MFCMA. My argument is simi
lar to the statement against gun control
that "guns don't kill people, people kill
people." In managing fisheries, it is man
that specifies goals, objectives, and regu
lations. The paper upon which the Act is
printed provides only a set of guidelines.
The fact that Councils and NMFS have
elected not to promote efficiency or min
imize all costs is their decision. The Na-
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tional Standards clearly indicate, where
practical, that these conditions shall be
considered.
Instead, and with some fear, I offer
that the reasons for the failure to achieve
rational economical management are our
predecessors and we economists of
today. Alternatively, I propose that some
of the failure is due to 1) our wide accep
tance of economic theory and applied
methods, 2) our limited and often inade
quate economic analysis, and 3) the lack
of importance placed on economics by
NMFS and the councils.
I do not propose to know all there is to
know about economic theory and applied
methods. However, I do know that al
most every paper or text on detennining
the optimum rate of exploitation com
mences with a control theoretic model
(e.g., Clark, 1976, 1985; Waugh, 1984).
Most often, the objective is to maximize
total net discounted revenues of the in
dustry subject to a growth-removal equi
librium condition:
00

Max

I

o

e(-rt)o[Poh(t)
- C(X)oh(t)]dt,

(1)

subject to [F(X) - h(t)]
where P is output price, h is output, C is
cost per unit of h, X is stock size, F(X)
is a growth function, r is the social dis
count rate, and t is time.
Although there have been substantial
variations of equation (1) which include
multiple objectives, uncertainty, price re
sponse to quantity changes, and different
growth functions, I think we must ask the
question "How can management authori
ties seriously consider economic objec
tives if equation (1) cannot be solved if
expanded to include Anderson's political
bioregunomics framework. A simple ex
pansion of equation (1) is all we have to
offer?" It is also quite likely that equa
tion (1) in which demand includes substi
tute species, cost is not separable be
tween stocks and production, and the
production technology varies over finns
would likely present a difficult problem
to solve.
Equation (I) also suggests another
possible failure on our part and relates to
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Anderson's criteria for an intertemporal
harvest plan in which the correct amount
is harvested each year. First, is there any
reason to believe that any of the eco
nomic functions will be constant over all
time periods; dynamic processes charac
terize fisheries. Second, equation (1)
leads to either a steady state solution or a
"bang-bang" control; we must ask
whether these solutions are practical, rea
sonable, and feasible. Intuitively, I doubt
it. Third, if the problem was specified as
a finite time horizon problem, how would
we establish the appropriate time inter
val? A quick review of five texts (Chow,
1975; Clark, 1976, 1985; Kamien and
Schwartz, 1981; Mangel, 1985) fails to
provide any guidance about the relation
ship between specification, solution, and
the selection of a time interval in a dy
namic problem.
In practice, I know of no fishery in
which the mangement rules were estab
lished based on a control model. The
problem, in fact, is not caused by the
control theoretic approach. The problem
is, however, related to the control model.
The model serves as a reference for the
economic theory and principles used to
analyze the economics of fisheries, and it
provides the basis for establishing eco
nomic goals and objectives of manage
ment. The consistent publication of con
trol models in the literature only serves to
reinforce its use by economists.
A further examination of equation (1)
and relating it to economic theory and
research needs illustrates the second pos
sible reason why I believe economists are
part of the problem. Most often, the
specifications of the economic and
growth functions in equation (1) or in
other economic models used in fisheries
are overly simplified. In many instances,
the economic specifications bear no re
semblance to economic theory.
For example, what type of inverse de
mand function has nominal price as a lin
ear function of only the quantity demand.
As economists, we know that the ex
vessel demand is a derived demand and
should satisfy certain properties. Yet, the
managment plans and economic analyses
of fisheries abound with these ad-hoc
price response specifications. Alterna
tively, how many fisheries are single
product fisheries. Almost all of the eco

nomic and biological specifications of
the technology used in fisheries assume
the technology is nonjoint-in-inputs or
sufficient conditions exist for input and
output aggregation. I suspect, as does
Clark (1985), that a single-product fish
ery is quite rare. In the event of multiple
products, the economic analysis and de
tennination of optimum yields is likely to
be very difficult.
In many of the empirical economic
studies of fisheries, ad-hoc economic
specifications are used. On occasion,
from 5 to 20 equations may be specified
and estimated as part of a system, but not
one of the equations will be consistent
with economic theory. How, then, are
such results to be interpreted and applied
to fisheries management. More impor
tant, what is the valuation of economics
by managers when presented with such
results.
In a "round-about" way, I am suggest
ing a need for more basic economic re
search in fisheries. That is, if economics
is to serve as a basis for optimal manage
ment, we, as economists, must provide
good economic analysis of the basic is
sues. A partial review of the economic
programs and research within NMFS fur
ther illustrates this need and highlights
the lack of importance placed on eco
nomics. NMFS is selected because it is
the "national" fisheries agency, and thus,
should indicate the importance placed
and conveyed to others on the economics
of fisheries.
The economics program of NMFS
consists of economists located in Wash
ington, D.C., (!nd at several centers, re
gional offices, and laboratories. There
does not appear to be a well defined goal
and set of research objectives for the pro
gram. However, a substantial amount of
analysis and research is conducted by
these economists. This includes analysis
of ex-vessel prices, productivity, im
ports, and the technology. Unfortu
nately, this research is most often reac
tive or necessitated by a problem which
must be analyzed over a very short time
period. These conditions likely prevent
the implementation of a basic research
program and limit economic analysis.
It is more alarming that, given the
level of resources allocated to econom
ics, inadequate but still quite large, there
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are no routine economic reports and anal
ysis. I consider the "Fisheries of the
United States" publication and similar re
ports to be data summaries and not eco
nomic reports. For example, there is no
regular publication on productivity, the
status and implications of imports, costs
and utilization of the factors of produc
tion, short-run price projections, or the
economic implications of management
plans and regulations. There, in fact, is
no routine publication that summarizes
the number of fishermen, vessels, land
ings, and revenue by fishery, region, or
state. This type of information is rou
tinely produced by other government
agencies concerned with the develop
ment, management, and regulation of
other industries.
This gives the impression that NMFS
is not very concerned with economics. If
this is the case, the gap between eco
nomic theory and fisheries management
is not likely to be narrowed.
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To narrow the gap, NMFS must as
sume a leadership role, at least, in the
identification of issues in need of basic
research, NMFS, along with the states,
universities, Councils, industry, and con
cerned individuals, must provide sub
stantial resource support. This includes
funding, data access, and identification
of the issues in need of attention. In tum,
our job as economists is to conduct com
petent research on the basic-issues. I be
lieve we will discover that once we pro
vide competent research on the basic
issues, economics will become a signifi
cant driving force in the management of
fisheries under MFCMA.
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